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## WEEKLY REPORT



# THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

4 May 1966

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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Central Intelligence Agency

## THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(28 April - 4 May 1966)

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(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by CIA without final coordination.)

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
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

Political developments during the week continued to center around the forthcoming elections for a constitutional convention. Peripheral demonstrations and minor incidents of violence, however, helped to maintain a troubled atmosphere.

Friendly military operations decreased during the week, but enemy-initiated activity showed a slight rise, with the I Corps continuing to report the greatest number of Communist incidents.

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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Political developments during the week continued to center around the forthcoming elections for a constitutional convention. Peripheral demonstrations and minor incidents of violence, however, helped to maintain a troubled atmosphere.

2. Although a government advisory council recommended a 100-man committee to draft an election law, the government plans to convene only a 34-man group on 5 May to begin the work. Hopefully, the election regulations will be formulated by the end of the month, which will allow the government the 90-day period necessary for the mechanical organization of the elections themselves. However, now that the pressure of Buddhist and antigovernment demonstrations has ceased, there may be an inclination among some government officials to delay the election date. Indicative of this trend was a remark made by Premier Ky to newsmen on 3 May to the effect that the government would try to hold elections by October--a month later than had been indicated in the government decree of 14 April.

3. Despite a flurry of coup rumors last weekend that were evidently touched off by the dismissal of police director Lieu, current reporting indicates that various factions within the military government have no plans to engineer an internal coup for the time being. In regard to re-establishing government authority in central Vietnam, I Corps commander General Dinh has continued to utilize a conciliatory approach and to rely upon Buddhist cooperation to restore at least superficial order. Internal strife among Nationalist Party (VNQDD) elements in I Corps, however, has resulted recently in individual acts of violence in Da Nang. Catholic demonstrations opposing the struggle force are also continuing in the Da Nang area and near Saigon. A final factor that could cause further friction is the attempt by the incoming national police director, Colonel Nguyen Ngoc Loan, to install police officials in I Corps who are more responsive to Saigon. In particular, Loan has apparently

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countermanded General Dinh's recent appointment of a new regional police director.

4. Thus far, the Buddhists have voiced no objections to the government's 34-man election law drafting committee, and have shown little concern over general election methods. However, they appear to be on a direct collision course with the military regime regarding the provisional government that will function in the interim between elections for a constitutional convention and the actual adoption and implementation of the constitution itself--a period that could stretch out to nearly a year. The Buddhists, in accordance with the recommendations of the National Political Congress that met in Saigon last month, maintain that the elected constitutional convention should name the provisional government, while Premier Ky and other current government officials appear determined to maintain their primacy instead.

5. Conversations during the week between US Embassy officials and various Buddhist leaders indicate that the Buddhists do not plan to organize a formal party for the forthcoming elections, nor do they plan to put forth any actual candidates themselves. Instead, local committees will be established to back the "best candidates," regardless of their party or religious affiliation. Various Buddhists have also suggested that the candidates be elected on a provincial rather than a population basis, and that the constitutional convention should consist of between 100 and 150 representatives. Few details concerning the constitution itself were discussed by the Buddhists, although they probably will favor some sort of parliamentary system. The decision not to establish an overt political party reflects the past Buddhist tendency to maneuver freely behind the scenes with only minimal responsibilities, and will also make it difficult for other groups to organize against them.

6. The non-Buddhist groups that hope to influence the outcome of the upcoming elections show signs of attempting to unite against the Buddhists. The Catholics and the VNQDD were the most vociferous, especially in

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I Corps and around Saigon, where they held rallies and demonstrations espousing anti-Communist, pro-American military, and--in some cases--anti - Tri Quang themes. At this time, however, there is little cohesion among the various groups. Some coalitions have been discussed privately between non-Buddhist leaders and with US officials, but the degree of public receptivity has not been determined.

### Economic Situation

7. On 29 April a high-level meeting was held in Saigon between Vietnamese and US economic officials. As a result of this meeting, Minister Thanh agreed to release an additional \$42 million in foreign exchange for GVN-financed imports in May and June, and announced that a directive had been issued on new procedures for goods imported under the commodity import program. USAID has worked closely with GVN Ministry of Economy Officials in writing a directive to establish a quarterly consolidation of import applications and to force importers to go through Office of Small Business procedures to a greater extent than heretofore. These procedures entail much stricter price checks. As a result of this GVN action, USAID agreed to release a large block of funds (\$108 million) so that licensing can be resumed at a normal pace during the second quarter.

8. The rate of license applications for GVN-financed imports rose to 277 daily during 18-23 April, compared with a daily rate of only 100 during 1-8 April and 172 during 9-16 April. Importers were attempting to beat the 30 April deadline for license applications under the \$58.4-million GVN foreign-exchange release announced on 7 March for March-April import licensing. Actual licensing of GVN-financed imports, which was negligible during March, amounted to \$21.3 million during the first three weeks of April.

9. The index of Saigon retail prices was generally unchanged from last week. Rice prices, however, continued to rise and the price of the average grade reached a new retail high of 920 piasters per 100

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kilograms. It appears that Minister Thanh's policy of selling government rice at low prices in Saigon has not been entirely successful. Although the Ministry of Economy is selling at low prices to retailers in Saigon, these retailers report a considerable lag in the delivery of this rice. Moreover, by exerting control over the rice brought to Saigon by convoy, the Ministry of Economy has reduced the flow of rice to the open market where dealers from surrounding provinces purchase large amounts of rice outside of the ministry's sales program. With demand remaining constant, this reduction in the supply of rice has resulted in higher prices on the open market.

10. In the Saigon free market, the price of US \$10 bills rose one piaster per dollar to a 1966 high of 173, or close to the 1965 high of 175. The price of \$10 MPC (scrip) also rose by one piaster per dollar to 119. On the other hand, both the piaster-dollar cross rate in Hong Kong and the price of gold fell by one piaster per dollar to 152 and 245, respectively.

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## B. MILITARY SITUATION

1. Enemy-initiated activity increased during the week ending 30 April.

2. During this period there were 790 Communist-initiated incidents compared to the previous week's 765. There were 33 attacks (three large scale) and 527 acts of terrorism compared to the previously reported 20 and 570, respectively. The kill ratio favored free world forces 1.7 to 1 compared to the week before's recomputed 5.33 to 1. Viet Cong losses for the period were 456 killed and 98 captured. Vietnamease casualties for the period were 227 killed, 613 wounded, and 29 missing or captured--a total of 869 compared to the previous week's 368. US losses for the week were 70 killed and 589 wounded and three captured--a total of 662 compared to last week's 582. Free world forces lost two killed and 11 wounded (all ROK). The South Vietnamese lost 192 weapons (three crew served) while the Viet Cong lost 168 weapons (one crew served).

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA/ CAPTURED</u>	<u>TOTAL CASUALTIES</u>
US	70	589	3	662
ARVN	227	613	29	869
THIRD COUNTRY	2	11	---	13
VIET CONG/PAVN	456	---	98	554

### GVN/Allied Activities

3. Friendly large- and small-unit operations, as well as corresponding enemy contacts, decreased during the week.

4. In I Corps, US Marine elements conducting Operation GEORGIA in Quang Nam Province inflicted losses of 93 killed and 21 captured on the Viet Cong while sustaining losses of seven killed and 74 wounded.

5. Combined Operation FILLMORE (rice-harvest security) being conducted by elements of the US 101st

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Airborne Division and the ROK Capital Division in Phu Yen Province of II Corps continues. Friendly forces have lost 16 killed and 105 wounded while inflicting losses of 193 killed and 44 captured on the enemy.

6. In Tay Ninh Province of III Corps, the forces conducting combined US/ARVN Operation BIRMINGHAM/AN DAN 79/66 successfully seized a large enemy supply cache. The units seized 1,364 tons of rice, 185.5 tons of salt, 6,800 uniforms plus several thousand sets of other clothing, and destroyed 27 base camps. Ninety-three Viet Cong have been killed and ten captured. Friendly forces have lost 42 killed and 175 wounded.

7. Elements of the ARVN 21st Division terminated a three-day search-and-destroy operation in Chuong Thien Province, IV Corps. Friendly units lost 29 killed and 138 wounded while reportedly killing 247 Viet Cong.

8. Free world forces conducted 104 battalion-size or larger operations during the week, 49 of them achieving contact--32 GVN, 14 US, one ROK, and two combined. There were 26,065 small-unit operations, including 3,584 conducted by US forces and 478 by free world forces. Of the 154 that achieved contact with the enemy, 98 were conducted by US units and two by free world forces.

9. Seven B-52 Stratofortress missions utilizing 54 aircraft were flown during the week ending 1 May. The target areas were in the South Vietnamese provinces of Tay Ninh, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin.

10. On 25 April, a total of 15 aircraft (LOW STOOP III and IV) supported ground search-and-destroy Operation BIRMINGHAM in Tay Ninh Province. On 28 April in Quang Tin Province, a total of 18 aircraft (SPUR TIP I, II, and III) struck Viet Cong troops that were considered a threat to the Tien Phuoc Special Forces Camp; no ground follow-up was scheduled. On 29 April, three aircraft (SNAP CAP II) made a harassing attack in Quang Ngai Province against a reported enemy base and supply point near the Tra Bong Special Forces Camp; no ground follow-up was scheduled. On 30 April, three aircraft (FINE SAND

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III) made a harassing attack in Quang Nam Province against a reported Viet Cong training camp. No ground follow-up was scheduled; however, ground search-and-destroy Operation GEORGIA is in this area. On 1 May, 15 aircraft (LOCK BOX IV) attacked a suspected ammunition storage area in Tay Ninh Province; no ground follow-up was scheduled.

11. During the period 22-28 April, a total of 2,455 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, and Marine aircraft. VNAF aircraft flew a portion of the armed reconnaissance sorties. The cumulative results of these strikes as reported by pilots included the destruction of 2,015 structures, 38 bunkers, 47 sampans, 5 trenches, 213 huts, 49 riverboats, 7 AW positions, 5 storage areas, 3 trucks, and 1 radio station. Damage was reported to 1,263 structures, 5 bridges, 4 bunkers, 32 sampans, 223 huts, 9 riverboats, 14 AW positions, and 4 trucks. There were a total of 92 secondary explosions.

12. On 23 April, an A-4 Skyhawk was downed by probable ground fire approximately 80 nautical miles south-southeast of Saigon. The pilot ejected and was rescued.

13. Forces conducting Operation MARKET TIME searched 5,319 junks and 23,736 people. Of these, two junks and 66 people were detained. During the week, a US Coast Guard cutter was briefly fired on by a Cambodian PT boat off the northwestern tip of Phu Quoc Island, IV Corps. No damage or casualties resulted.

#### Communist Activity

14. I Corps continues to lead all other areas in incidents, especially terrorism and antiaircraft fire. The density of enemy units in the northern provinces probably has caused greater demands on the people for support. To ensure that the required support is rendered, in view of friendly activity in the area, the enemy has probably reverted to an increased terrorism campaign. Other activity in the area consisted of a mortar attack on the Hue airfield in Thua Thien Province on 24 April, railway and highway sabotage, and harassing attacks on friendly security elements and installations.

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15. No significant Communist activity occurred in II Corps during the week. The continued low incident rate is probably an attempt by the enemy to avoid any act that might draw together the dissident political forces in this area.

16. In Phuoc Tuy Province of III Corps, an attack on a New Life Hamlet by an estimated Viet Cong battalion on 26 April and the simultaneous mortaring of a nearby post, resulted in friendly casualties of 40 killed and 18 wounded, with 21 weapons and two radios also lost. Enemy losses were one killed and one captured. Other activity consisted of small-scale attacks and harassing fire on friendly installations.

17. The greatest number of small-scale attacks occurred in IV Corps. Activity in the area continues to be limited to guerrilla-type, small-unit operations in comparison to the enemy activity in the northern corps areas. Although the enemy in IV Corps maintains the capability to mass large units whenever such an action would be advantageous, the lack of cover in the area and a continued ability to maintain influence through terrorism and small-unit actions indicates that the Communists will probably continue operating in the present manner, massing only when the advantages of such a move greatly overshadow the disadvantages.

18. Changes in lines of communication status consist of the opening of National Route 1 in Binh Dinh Province (except the portion south of Qui Nhon) and in Khanh Hoa Province. Route 14 is closed in Binh Long Province. An extended portion of the national railroad has been reopened between Ca Na, Ninh Thuan Province, and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province.

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C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

1. Training for the specialized members (civil affairs, census/grievance, and new life development) of the revolutionary development cadre groups began on 25 April at the National Cadre Training Center. This class, the first to receive such training under the revised program, will number about 1,500 persons; some 3,200 cadres are programmed for specialist training in the next class.

2. The pacification effort is suffering from the effects of economic difficulties that seem to be hampering general progress throughout the country. Construction prices, due to inflation, are rising in some cases beyond the 1966 budget estimates of the program. To counteract the rising prices, the provinces have been authorized to use the reserve funds of the Revolutionary Development Ministry and to negotiate contracts directly with "able and trustworthy contractors" in cases where no bids at all for construction projects have been received.

3. On the basis of agreements reached at the Honolulu Conference substantial GVN/US planning is under way to revitalize village and hamlet governments. Reforms include the election of six-member village councils--possibly by 29 May, the date set for the election of one third of the provincial councils. Each elected village council would then select a council chairman and also a village chief, who up to now has been appointed by the province chief. The US has agreed to support a wage increase for village and hamlet officials to bring their salaries in line with those received by the cadre groups working in their areas.

4. The corps and district civil administrative apparatus has also been reviewed and will be the object of certain reforms. The corps commanders, who are also the official government delegates for civil administration, will be granted more latitude in controlling administrative personnel and in shifting funds within their regions. Three administrative bureaus, instead of the present five, will deal with military and political affairs, administration

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and finance, and economic and social welfare. Proposed changes in the district apparatus include the establishment of an advisory council made up of the chairmen of the various village councils. Moreover, consideration is being given to the possible replacement of the district deputy for security--now a military officer--by a civilian.

#### Returnees (Chieu Hoi)

5. For the second consecutive week, the total number of defectors from the Viet Cong decreased significantly. Only 285 persons rallied during the week ending 22 April, apparently a result of the continuing political instability in the northern provinces and the lack of military activity. US Mission officials point out, however, that definite improvements in the program have been realized since last fall, and that high-level GVN officials have demonstrated more support since 1 January 1966.

6. Psychological operations before and after major military contacts have contributed heavily to the successful inducement of Vietnamese Communists and sympathizers to rally to the government. Millions of Chieu Hoi leaflets, safe conduct passes, and maps bearing instructions on how to rally have been dropped on known and suspected infiltration routes and in-country Viet Cong positions, often in conjunction with B-52 strikes. In the central highlands, leaflets written in tribal languages are being dropped. Moreover, day and night aerial broadcasts are being undertaken to heighten the enemy's anxieties, these broadcasts serve as a useful, though technically difficult, means of warning villagers of impending air strikes in their area.

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## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. The full text of Premier Pham Van Dong's report to last month's National Assembly meeting, which became available this week, indicated that the premier not only delivered a pep talk to the assembled delegates but also engaged in a relatively frank discussion of the difficulties caused by the US bombing raids. Dong admitted that the North Vietnamese had been forced to mobilize large segments of the population to keep transportation routes open and to strengthen both civil defense and antiaircraft defenses. The premier also confessed that the allocation of manpower resources to meet wartime priorities had been a real problem. The premier claimed, however, that this effort had paid off, and that the monthly average of tonnage moved had increased in 1966 over the last few months of 1965.

2. While cautioning against possible further US escalation of the war, Dong also struck an optimistic note by claiming that the Vietnamese had successfully challenged US military power during the past year, especially in the air. This same theme of optimism dominated a flood of DRV propaganda celebrating the alleged shootdown of the 1,000th US aircraft over North Vietnam on 29 April, a claim that is roughly four times the actual number of US losses. A Nhan Dan editorial occasioned by the shoot-down claim asserted that everywhere in the country people had made contributions to the fight, and that the militia and self-defense forces had demonstrated "many new capabilities and were playing an important role." One of the new capabilities mentioned by Nhan Dan was the ability to use ground-to-air missiles, the first public admission by the DRV that there are SAMs in the North Vietnamese arsenal.

### Sino-Soviet Relations on Vietnam

3. The Chinese Communists bitterly assailed Soviet policy on Vietnam this week and flatly denied recent Soviet charges that Peking has hampered Soviet military shipments to the DRV. Speaking at a 30 April mass rally in Peking honoring a visiting high-level Albanian delegation, Premier Chou En-lai disparaged Soviet aid to Hanoi as meager in quantity and inferior

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in quality. He also berated the present Soviet leadership in the harshest terms for "sham anti-imperialism" and for collaboration with the US.

4. Chou's remarks were followed up on 3 May with a Foreign Ministry statement designed to undercut Soviet claims of "all out" support for Vietnam and of Chinese obstructionism in the transport of military aid shipments to the DRV. The statement provided the first detailed information on the amount of Soviet military assistance transiting China for the DRV. It asserted that Communist China transported 43,000 tons of Soviet military supplies to North Vietnam in 1965, a figure close to intelligence estimates of the actual tonnage moved. In addition, the statement claimed that during the first quarter of 1966 the USSR used only one third of the 1,730 rail cars Communist China had agreed to make available for military deliveries, and that such goods as were sent by the Soviets had been moved on by the Chinese "with priority, at a high speed, and free of charge."

5. Despite Chinese protestations, however, evidence indicates that Peking has placed onerous restrictions on overland deliveries. Although the restrictions are unlikely to have limited the quantity or types of weapons supplied by the USSR to North Vietnam, they have slowed down the pace of deliveries.

6. This outpouring of Chinese invective betrays Peking's discomfiture over the effectiveness of the recent Soviet charges. Moreover, it probably also reflects Peking's sensitivity to the Soviet success in its call for "unity" at the 23rd CPSU congress last March.

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### III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

On 26 April, the semi-official Vietnam Press Agency carried the BBC interview of GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Do. In reply to a question referring to Senator Mansfield's recent proposals on Vietnam, Do stated that "we must all attempt to apply good will in order to help restore peace, but it is also necessary that our enemies, first and foremost, should have will for peace." Do noted that Senator Mansfield's apparent allusion to the Viet Cong as one of the "certain essential elements" in the Vietnamese situation showed "considerable generosity of spirit" toward an organization that "is only a propaganda instrument of Hanoi."

#### B. CAMBODIA

1. In a public speech on 24 April, Prince Sihanouk stated that the DRV, Cambodia, and the NFLSV have decided with Cambodia to sign "solemn agreements shortly at a summit meeting which would establish a definite basis for a peaceful coexistence between our two countries."

2. A US military spokesman in Saigon announced on 3 May that on 30 April a battalion of the US 1st Infantry Division operating on the eastern bank of the Gai Bac River in Tay Ninh Province received mortar and small-arms fire from the Cambodian side of the border and that the American commander then directed artillery fire on the gun positions. The US Embassy in Saigon recommends that a US protest be lodged with the Cambodian Government.

#### C. WEST GERMANY

Eight tons of medical supplies from the Federal Republic of Germany arrived in Saigon on 29 April. This is the first shipment of the 1,500 tons of medical supplies (valued at \$4,375,000) offered by Germany.

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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS


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WEEKLY REPORT 23 APRIL-30 APRIL 1966

## Total Personnel Losses


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(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)



### US Combat Casualties in Vietnam (including North Vietnam)

	Fatalities	Non-fatal Wounds	Captured	Missing
Cumulative, 1961-1964	255	1524	10	12
Cumulative, 1965	1365	6110	15	136
Cumulative, 1966 to date	1532	9365	8	53
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3152</b>	<b>16999</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>201</b>






## Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses (US/GVN/Other Free World)

Killed in action
  Missing or Captured in action
  Wounded in action

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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

## WEEKLY REPORT 23 APRIL-30 APRIL 1966




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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS MONTHLY REPORT

APRIL 1966

## PERSONNEL LOSSES (Killed in Action, Missing in Action, Captured)



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
Wounded not included;  
Viet Cong figures unavailable

# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

## MONTHLY REPORT

APRIL 1966

### VIET CONG INCIDENTS



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
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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

MONTHLY REPORT

APRIL 1966

## WEAPONS LOSSES (South Vietnamese and Viet Cong)



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South Vietnamese and Viet Cong Casualties and  
Weapons Losses: 1962 - 30 April 1966

## 1. General Statistical Data:

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Jan	1962	1825	299	1294	475	212	116	390	890	1896	-	-
	1963	927	453	1754	908	318	102	379	1463	2451	457	683
	1964	1770	343	1223	913	-	555	240	1811	1463	917	532
	1965	2206	904	2203	1938	-	471	565	3313	2768	1700	711
	1966	3914	747	2648	1557	-	450	588	2754	3236	935	979
Feb	1962	1460	244	1205	300	316	124	353	668	1874	-	-
	1963	788	379	1082	656	303	82	292	1117	1677	253	399
	1964	2078	374	1055	916	-	303	289	1593	1344	708	471
	1965	1982	880	1564	1840	-	1394	309	4114	1873	2454	620
	1966	3100	1015	4727	2095	-	477	508	3587	5235	1076	1219
Mar	1962	1961	523	1456	737	551	140	523	1400	2530	-	-
	1963	1282	410	1443	851	368	66	222	1327	2033	467	367
	1964	2160	439	1456	1249	-	345	531	2033	1987	814	532
	1965	2056	751	2022	1633	-	720	394	3104	2416	1442	698
	1966	3670	938	5685	1961	-	466	604	3365	6289	1393	1632
Apr	1962	1933	387	1596	532	292	151	415	1070	2303	-	-
	1963	1331	506	1660	878	256	96	388	1440	2304	797	468
	1964	2284	594	1671	1584	-	398	245	2576	1916	990	424
	1965	1860	591	1909	1650	-	232	529	2473	2438	757	973
	1966	3235	573	2818	1522	-	121	483	2216	3301	594	829
May	1962	1825	390	1756	509	352	94	524	993	2632	-	-
	1963	1208	435	1895	889	295	94	695	1418	2885	463	564
	1964	2143	458	1135	987	-	202	242	1647	1377	723	281
	1965	2263	1049	1975	2143	-	873	548	4065	2523	1701	831
Jun	1962	1477	325	1666	613	413	77	441	1015	2520	-	-
	1963	1311	389	1863	772	310	90	437	1251	2609	580	394
	1964	2062	494	1005	1145	-	313	230	1952	1235	718	387
	1965	2597	1211	2208	1920	-	1260	189	4391	2397	2387	793
Jul	1962	1564	384	1544	686	424	212	542	1282	2510	-	-
	1963	1368	529	1918	1071	372	306	387	1906	2677	663	374
	1964	3045	900	1427	1812	-	510	219	3222	1646	1889	447
	1965	2520	1160	2980	1591	-	540	580	3425	3560	1375	882

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**SECRET**

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	Killed in Action		Wounded in Action		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses		
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	
Aug	1962	1642	377	2271	626	367	63	669	1066	3307	-	-
	1963	1349	411	1685	804	237	352	482	1567	2404	637	428
	1964	2580	721	1449	1612	-	478	282	2811	1731	1106	619
	1965	2498	808	3624	1945	-	287	606	3040	4230	705	1074
Sep	1962	1375	419	2218	646	365	59	446	1124	3029	-	-
	1963	1763	672	1982	1155	234	566	347	2393	2563	878	389
	1964	3091	819	1187	1759	-	737	230	3315	1417	1465	525
	1965	2473	655	3485	1724	-	266	838	2645	4323	778	838
Oct	1962	1357	365	1967	619	286	64	373	1048	2626	-	-
	1963	1422	428	1520	989	244	398	236	1815	2000	753	330
	1964	2827	739	1617	1583	-	693	576	3015	2193	1510	482
	1965	3330	961	3874	2416	-	225	660	3602	4534	762	1013
Nov	1962	1311	410	1982	834	368	92	561	1336	2911	-	-
	1963	3182	664	2333	1554	373	665	252	2883	2958	1595	455
	1964	1982	574	1747	1404	-	410	570	2388	2317	1104	515
	1965	3638	1034	5516	2056	-	520	592	3610	6108	1126	2164
Dec	1962	1346	294	2203	618	289	78	463	990	2955	-	-
	1963	1921	389	1440	961	191	320	190	1670	1821	724	546
	1964	2504	1002	1813	2053	-	1092	503	4147	2316	2111	666
	1965	4106	1239	4076	2262	-	926	516	4427	4592	1728	1158

## Composite Annual Totals

Time Period	VC Incidents	KIA		WIA		Captured or Missing		Total Casualties		Weapons Losses	
		GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC	GVN	VC
1962	19076	4417	21158	7195	4235	1270	5700	12882	31093	5195	4049*
1963	17852	5665	20575	11488	3501	3137	4307	20290	28383	8267	5397
1964	28526	7457	16785	17017	-	6036	4157	30510	20942	14055	5881
1965	31529	11243	35436	23118	-	7848	6326	42209	41762	16915	11755
**1966	13919	3273	15878	7135	-	1514	2183	11922	18061	3998	4659

\*Monthly data unavailable for 1962 Weapons Losses.

\*\*Through 30 April 1966

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2. Viet Cong Incidents: 1962 - 30 April 1966

Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small- Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total					
Jan	1962	1825	528	21	0	549	839	180	257	-
	1963	927	242	8	2	252	447	49	179	-
	1964	1770	218	2	3	223	1244	129	174	-
	1965	2206	57	5	1	63	1489	272	170	212
	1966	3914	42	23	5	70	2490	312	299	743
Feb	1962	1460	480	20	0	500	613	137	210	-
	1963	788	181	13	1	195	433	69	91	-
	1964	2078	211	3	3	217	1389	210	271	-
	1965	1982	73	6	3	82	1411	267	91	131
	1966	3100	50	10	9	69	1829	201	172	829
Mar	1962	1961	561	27	0	588	660	290	423	-
	1963	1282	333	11	0	344	653	131	154	-
	1964	2160	198	4	1	203	1632	158	167	-
	1965	2056	80	3	3	86	1476	240	90	164
	1966	3670	32	10	10	52	2332	212	154	920
Apr	1962	1933	470	27	0	497	1024	220	192	-
	1963	1331	371	9	3	383	688	105	155	-
	1964	2284	211	6	3	220	1738	169	157	-
	1965	1860	38	1	4	43	1407	149	96	165
	*1966	3235	61	7	9	77	2238	252	110	513
May	1962	1825	490	28	0	528	892	154	251	-
	1963	1208	344	13	0	357	608	93	150	-
	1964	2143	170	3	2	175	418	217	140	193
	1965	2263	40	7	11	58	1558	365	115	170
Jun	1962	1477	339	23	0	362	736	157	222	-
	1963	1311	398	11	1	410	652	107	142	-
	1964	2062	128	10	2	140	1390	176	162	194
	1965	2597	62	1	6	69	1784	469	103	172

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Time Period	Viet Cong Incidents	A T T A C K S				Terrorism	Sabotage	Propa- ganda	Anti- Aircraft	
		Small- Scale	Co. Size	BN. Size	Total					
Jul	1962	1564	437	10	1	448	735	158	223	-
	1963	1368	398	8	1	407	698	80	183	-
	1964	3045	166	12	7	185	2132	286	224	218
	1965	2520	42	0	6	48	1706	400	154	212
Aug	1962	1642	368	10	0	378	885	146	233	-
	1963	1349	356	11	1	368	647	113	221	-
	1964	2580	107	3	3	113	1775	315	173	204
	1965	2498	38	9	5	52	1597	349	200	300
Sep	1962	1375	382	9	0	391	624	178	182	-
	1963	1763	483	17	3	503	889	164	207	-
	1964	3091	110	4	4	118	1938	482	178	375
	1965	2473	19	7	5	31	1530	278	185	449
Oct	1962	1357	406	12	1	419	583	189	166	-
	1963	1422	359	6	0	365	802	105	150	-
	1964	2827	75	2	6	83	1790	480	197	277
	1965	3330	24	8	12	44	1969	415	198	704
Nov	1962	1311	411	7	3	421	614	144	132	-
	1963	3182	631	11	3	645	1990	269	278	-
	1964	1982	57	2	1	60	1391	247	109	175
	1965	3638	26	16	10	52	2234	486	255	611
Dec	1962	1346	375	8	1	384	670	107	185	-
	1963	1921	258	3	0	261	1298	111	251	-
	1964	2504	81	9	6	96	1719	318	128	243
	1965	4106	32	18	7	57	2572	442	317-	718

Composite Annual Totals

1962	19076	5247	6	212	5465	8875	2060	2676	No Data
1963	17852	4354	15	121	4490	9805	1396	2161	No Data
1964	28526	1732	41	60	1833	19556	3178	2080	1879
1965	31529	531	73	81	685	20730	4132	1974	4008
*1966	13919	185	50	33	268	8934	977	735	3005

\*Through 30 April 1966

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